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COVID-19 resulted in an infodemic, which could erode public trust, impede
virus containment, and outlive the pandemic itself. The evolving and frag-
mented media landscape is a key driver of the spread of misinformation. Us-
ing misinformation identified by the fact-checking platform by Tencent and
posts on Weibo, our results showed that the evolution of misinformation fol-
lows an issue-attention cycle, pertaining to topics such as city lockdown, cures,
and preventions, and school reopening. Sources of authority weigh in on these
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topics, but their influence is complicated by peoples’ pre-existing beliefs and
cultural practices. Finally, social media has a complicated relationship with
established or legacy media systems. Sometimes they reinforce each other, but
in general, social media may have a topic cycle of its own making. Our findings
shed light on the distinct characteristics of misinformation during the COVID-
19 and offer insights into combating misinformation in China and across the
world at large.
Introduction
While the world is struggling to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, another more insidious epi-
demican infodemic, the term coined by WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus
to describe the prevalence of misinformation on the coronavirusis threatening the health and
safety of the public. Misinformation has existed throughout history; however, with the rise of
social media platformsTwitter, Facebook, Reddit, Weibo, microblogs, among othersits spread
has transcended borders and significantly increased in both pace and audience (1). Understand-
ing the flow and spread of misinformation is a vital issue to reduce its negative impacts. Just
as COVID-19 has now spread to millions worldwide, misinformation, ranging from pseudo-
science to conspiracy, has also spread online at an alarming rate, stirring panic and causing
confusion. In China, such panic and confusion have led to massive scrambling for fictitious
”cures,” such as garlic and Shuanghuanglian, a traditional Chinese medicine. Misinformation
is a complex and elusive concept to rigorously define, despite the growing volume and scope
of research on this topic. Briefly, it refers to ”information considered incorrect based on the
best available evidence from relevant experts at the time ” (2). In the past decade, the explo-
sion of social media has significantly increased the dissemination of misinformation pertaining
to numerous topics, including health, politics, and entertainment. As a result, identifying and
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combating health-related misinformation on social media has become a top concern of public
health (3). During the 2018-19 Ebola outbreak, more than 25 percent of people in DR Congo
believed misinformation about the outbreak, which significantly impeded public adoption of
preventive behavior (4). Factors affecting one’s response to misinformation are complex and
varied. Social norms, as well as the compatibility between the misinformation and one’s be-
lief system, have a significant influence on one’s acceptance of misinformation (5). To date,
the majority of research on misinformation has examined Western media platforms; however,
Chinese social media constitutes a very significant market. Weibo hosts more than 556 mil-
lion registered users, with 313 million considered active monthly, compared to 319 million on
Twitter (6). There are some differences when comparing Weibo and Twitter, however. Past re-
search has found that Weibo demonstrates a different pattern of information dissemination than
Twitter, though the two platforms are often viewed as comparable (7). Twitter is more open to
contestation and plural views, whereas Weibo is under stricter control and draconian censor-
ship by the Chinese government (8). Besides, compared to Twitter, the network connections on
Weibo are more hierarchical because users tend to follow others at a similar or higher social
level (6). Considering the consequential impact of misinformation, it is vital to investigate the
spread of misinformation in the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Chinathe first country undergo-
ing the massive infection and lockdownprovides a rich cultural context in which to investigate
COVID-19 related misinformation.
Event Driven Misinformation
Using the data collected from the Jiao Zhen platform from January 19, 2020, to March 29,
2020, we examine how misinformation (rumors and pseudoscience) and gossip (inconclusive
information) evolved throughout the different stages of COVID-19 epidemic in China, and how
its dissemination correlates to significant news events and government policies. It should be
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noted that the lockdown was around the time of the Spring Festival holiday–the most celebrated
tradition in China. During this time, local residents and migrant workers return home for family
reunions, generating the most significant human migration on the planet. As such, it is also
the time when the government is on high alert to ensure social order. The approaching of the
lunar-year festivity served to further amplify the abruptness of the lockdown measure, feeding
public uncertainties about the seriousness of the virus.
In Figure 1a, we present the temporal trend of misinformation and gossip, which covers
three waves of misinformation related to city lockdowns, transmission and cures, and reopening
schools. The first and most prominent peak happened shortly after the lockdown was announced
in Wuhan, which occurred on January 23, 2020. In response to this unprecedented policy, there
was a surge of sensationalizing information reporting severe disruptions in Wuhan (e.g., gas
stations within Wuhan had stopped operating) and similar policies in other cities in China (e.g., a
lockdown in Hankou in Wuhan and Xinyang in Henan). On February 2, Nanshan Zhong, a well-
respected pulmonologist and advisor to the Chinese government, announced that COVID-19
might spread via fecal transmission (9). After this, a spike of misinformation regarding possible
modes of transmission, cures, and prevention methods occurred. For example, a number of false
claims that the virus was spread through mosquitoes, flies, and through the sewer were posted.
A third peak occurs around March 9, when the epidemic transitioned into a containment stage.
During this peak, we observe a transition of misinformation related to lifting the lockdowns,
restarting schools, and news in foreign countries (e.g., Italy and the U.S.).
To understand the evolving topics, we present the word cloud, split by calendar month in
Figure 1b– 1d. Figure 1b covers the topics in January. The five most common words are
prevention, disinfection, hospital, lockdown, and treatment.. A unique aspect of misinformation
during this period is the manipulation of the original lockdown in Wuhan into lockdowns of
other cities and ridiculous policies in Wuhan.
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(a) Temporal distribution
(b) before February, 2020 (c) February, 2020 (d) March, 2020
(e) Summary of sensationalist misinformation
Figure 1: Temporal variations of misinformation. (a) Count of misinformation. The x-axis
corresponds to the date and the y-axis is the number of posts for different types of misinforma-
tion, with the corresponding category shown in the legend. We label major events (e.g., policies
or scientific news) with vertical lines. (b)-(d) Popular topics of misinformation. The size of the
word is proportional to the frequencies of occurrences from the titles of misinformation. For
clearer comparison, we removed some high frequency words that were popular throughout the
whole period, including novel coronavirus, infection, facial masks, Wuhan, epidemics. (e) is a
categorization over the misinformation that may cause fear.5
In February (as in Figure 1c), prevention, disinfection, treatment remained popular within
misinformation. Meanwhile, new topics emerged, such as patients, the U.S., and Nanshan
Zhong. As the epidemic spread further and the testing capacity increased, we observe more
sensationalist misinformation about patients, e.g., an outbreak in a specific city, or a confirmed
patient who contacted a large number of people. In the latter half of February, the U.S. at-
tracted a lot of attention in the media in China; most of the misinformation was related to the
U.S.’sU.S.’s confirmed cases and potential for an outbreak. Meanwhile, we also observed ma-
nipulations of Nanshan Zhong’s statement. Misrepresenting or manipulating an authoritative
figure, is a well-known misinformation strategy (10). Linking a credible/authoritative source to
misinformation tends to amplify the believability of the untruth. For example, a piece of mis-
information said that ”Nanshan Zhong’s team found that the infection rate of COVID is higher
on smokers than non-smokers.” This is the intentional exploitation of a reputable source to gain
legitimacy. Unfortunately, however, it confuses and serves to undermine the credibility of the
true experts and authoritative institutions. This example highlights the importance of both the
audience and social platforms of vetting the credibility of a claim by confirming the source of
the news.
In March, when the epidemic transitioned into a containment stage, resume school, isola-
tion, Italy, China, US became the focus, as shown in Figure 1d. There was a noticeable shift
in the focus compared with January and February with less misinformation about prevention,
disinfection, and treatment. Interestingly, there is a growing focus in resume school and Italy.
Throughout COVID-19, one prominent characteristic of misinformation is sensationalism
and scaremongering. Sources of misinformation manipulate true stories, forage ridiculous
news, and unverified sources to appeal to the crowds emotionally. Sensationalism in the media
has long been a popular topic of fierce debate. Despite the absence of an authoritative defi-
nition of media sensationalism, researchers tend to agree that sensational messages are likely
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to provoke senses and emotions. Furthermore, both content features (e.g., a topic about crime
typically is more sensational than other topics) and formal elements (e.g., using a colorful font
is more sensational than plain font) have proven to contribute to sensationalism (Grabe et al.,
2001). From a linguistic angle, Molek-Kozakowska (2013) identified a range of pragmatic de-
vices that may arouse audiences’ sensational feelings. Dubbed as sensational illocutions, the
methods include exposing (e.g., denouncing a crime), speculating (suggesting future conse-
quences), generalizing (extrapolating to a larger population), warning (generating anxiety) and
extolling (extraordinary facts/events/individuals). Integrating the perspectives mentioned above
on content, form, and pragmatics about sensationalism, the researchers followed the typical pro-
cedure for content analysis. They classified the misinformation into five categories, with a final
intercoder agreement of .94. In Figure 1e, the categories of misinformation comprise exposing
virus (e.d., the origin of the virus), extraordinary incidence (e.g., infected celebrity), warning
of risk severity (e.g., relapse), conflict/conspiracy (e.g., biological warfare), speculating hard
life (e.g., lockdowns). Take the category of exposing viruses as an example: several posts men-
tioned unknown virus sources, stories of diagnosed patients fleeing quarantine, or claims that
one patient infected a large number of others. Anxiety and emotions may also be entangled
with false claims of lockdowns of different cities, expressways, and even at gas stations.
Collective sensemaking and profiteering: tracing misinformation and gos-
sip on cures and prevention
Under periods of such uncertainty and anxiety, the public is more susceptible to misinformation,
which in turn self perpetuates. Some research suggests that social media users, in general, may
be more vulnerable to misinformation as well (11). As a major threat to public health, COVID-
19 has triggered a surge of misinformation on cures and prevention. This information can be
harmful for numerous reasons. Some of the misinformation may contribute to direct physical
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harm; for instance, claims that firecrackers and drinking boiling water will cure the virus.
In Figure 2, we analyzed the evolution of misinformation on cures and prevention. We
observe a large number of rumors regarding home remedies, at the beginning of the COVID-19
outbreak. Among the posts on Weibo about cures and prevention, home remedies attracted the
most extensive attention, followed by disinfection supplies and traditional Chinese medicine,
as shown on the upper panel of Figure 2a. Specifically, the interests in home remedies took
up more than 36.4% among all posts on misinformation throughout the observational period.
Figure 2b presents the top 10 cures and prevention methods mentioned, based on the number of
related posts in the Weibo. There is a constant interest in alcohol, tea, salt, disinfection supplies,
and ginger. We also observed a significant spike in Shuanghuanglian.
There are a variety of reasons to explain the popularity of home remedies in this context.
First, the public’s high familiarity with home remedies, connecting closely with day-to-day life
experience, could result in intuitive thinking as compared to critical or cognitive thinking (12).
Many of these home remedies, rooted in Chinese culture, have been on the market for quite
some time (e.g., vinegar, alcohol, and garlic). Some people utilized past experience and uncon-
firmed knowledge on home remedies to come up with potential solutions, which might be part
of collective sensemaking to resolve the anxiety in response to the ongoing health crisis (13).
Moreover, with repeat encounters in the past, the crowd is more likely to trust and endorse the
widespread, though unproven, use of home remedies (14), which also could explain why some
untested home remedies become constants in misinformation (15). Second, pandemic profiteer-
ing and price gouging involving face masks and fictitious cures emerge instantaneously. Some
unscrupulous actors take advantage of this as a source of revenue generation to sell their home
remedies by making false or unsubstantiated claims. For example, individuals attempt to gain
profits by selling mooncakes using SHL as an ingredient. Additionally, as home remedies be-
come popular, some Weibo users seize this opportunity to attract more followers in an attention
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driven-economy (16).
Fighting the infodemics: Shuanghuanglian as a case study
In order to reduce harm to the public, Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus
claims, ”it is essential to fight infodemics with information ” (17). However, information itself
is not enough to accomplish this goal. Due to a lack of comprehensive scientific training of
the public and even some news media, misunderstandings or inaccurate interpretations of sci-
entific studies may intensify the fear and panic. As an example, we investigate the claim that
Shuanghuanglian (SHL) can inhibit Coronavirus. On January 31, 2020, the Shanghai Institute
of Materia Medica (SIMM, under the Chinese Academy of Sciences) and the Wuhan Institute
of Virology had discovered that SHL herbal remedy could ”inhibit” 2019-nCov (18). The study
was based on a laboratory in vitro studies and required further clinical studies to confirm its
effectiveness on humans. However, the crowd interpreted the research as ’SHL helps to prevent
or cure coronavirus.’ Misinterpreting the result in an environment of significant uncertainty
contributed to a wave of panic-buying of SHL. The diffusion of SHL is shown in Figure 3a,
which is especially interesting due to the polarized news and discussions, as revealed by the
tags from the posts in Figure 3b. Specifically, the discussion revolves around the effectiveness
and ineffectiveness of SHL. In response to the panic-buying of the crowd, there is a caveat
against such behavior.
Individuals are more likely to believe information with a logical narrative from a source they
perceive to be credible (19). Source credibility varies, and may even be related to what sort of
media people use. A post that SHL was effective for inhibition of COVID-19 was endorsed by
two credible news media outlets, both providing an abbreviated scientific explanation. However,
due to a lack of understanding of science and the critical omission of a clear explanation by the
media, many understood the report as claiming SHL to be an effective treatment for COVID-
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(a) Evolution of the misinformation posts on cures and prevention.
(b) Temporal popularity of the top 10 misinformation posts on cures
Figure 2: Evolution of misinformation regarding cures and prevention for COVID-19.
We categorize different types of cures and prevention into food, Chinese medicine, Western
medicine, disinfection suppliers, daily necessities, and chemicals/germs. In the early stage of
the epidemic, there was a large amount of misinformation mentioning home remedies. As
time progressed, there was a shift towards Chinese medicine, especially in late January to
early February, with Shuanghuanglian as a representative example. The patriotism and cultural
preservation advanced by the Chinese government added to the ideas about the effectiveness
of Chinese herb medicine for COVID-19. Throughout the epidemic there was constant mis-
information regarding Western medicine; some were conventional medicines (e.g., aspirin and
mucosolvan), and others were more recently approved or studied (e.g., oseltamivir and resver-
atrol). Interestingly, as the epidemic in China shifted into the containment stage in mid-March,
the misinformation regarding cures and prevention almost completely disappeared.
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19. This highlights the importance of the press to be extremely accurate and specific about
scientific facts that are presented. (20). A similar phenomenon was observed in the U.S. with
hydroxychloroquine, causing a shortage of the medication for lupus and rheumatoid arthritis
patients, after repeated claims of its (unproven) efficacy to treat COVID-19 by President Donald
Trump (21).
(a) Cascade of Weibo (b) Popular tags in Weibo
Figure 3: SHL-related Weibo. (a) Cascade of Weibo related to SHL. Users who are against the
information (e.g., posted ”fake, false, should not use, no, negative”) are colored in blue. The
remaining are colored in red. We removed users who are not connected to any other individuals.
Accounts with a large number of posts are labeled by their account name. On January 31, 2020,
Xin Hua Shi Dian, a party-owned publisher, cited this article and quoted: ”SIMM and Wuhan
Institute of Virology had discovered that SHL herbal remedy could ”inhibit” 2019-nCov”, and
mentioned that SHL is currently under clinical trial in hospitals in Shanghai and Wuhan. Nine
minutes later, People’s Daily, with 1.1 billion followers, endorsed the same news. Four hours
later, Ding Xiang Doctor, an online community for physicians, raised the concern that such
news will cause a shortage, and therefore people should not use it for prevention. Four hours
later, a personal account with 2.7 million followers, shared an ironic post, which is surprisingly
more accessible than many other accounts with more followers (e.g., Li Shi Pin, which has
nine times more followers). This account held negative opinions about Chinese medicine and
specifically satirized about a person’s daily life with seven types of Chinese herb medicine. Six
hours later, Scientific China, a science account with 3.5 million followers, shared the post with a
catchy title, asking whether SHL can inhibit novel Coronavirus. SHL soon went viral on Weibo.
(b) Popular tags in Weibo related to SHL. The size of the tag is proportional to the number of
mentions.
It is known that ineffective scientific communication can be costly to society (22). This case
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study highlights the extraordinary significance of scientific communication in pandemics. For
scientists, understanding the significance of adequately communicated findings is paramount.
It is especially important for the scientific media to interpret the evidence, and to correct the
general media when it has misleading coverage. Press and media must understand how to serve
as the bridge and even translator between the scientists and the general public. Lastly, the
public must be critical about the direct interpretation of scientific reports without adequately
understanding and searching for reputable coverage and information before making decisions.
Discussion
Our findings on the evolution of misinformation speak to how the attention cycle–a concept
describing the complicated relationship between issue development and corresponding attention
from media and the public - operates during an epidemic. Attention cycles interact with the
ways that journalists frame issues, but social media communication patterns have independent
trajectories that build on the emotions that the issue and the platforms may encourage (23)
(Jordon, 2001; Shih et al., 2008).
Henry and Gordon (2001) argued that the public tends to pay more attention to an event
when it is novel, and such attention will shift to other happenings or new aspects of the event
as people become familiar with or bored of the incident (24). The issue cycle is related to the
influence of various factors such as journalistic practice, cultural values, and media systems,
and how individuals choose to use media and evaluate credible messages. The present study
showed that discussion of misinformation follows a unique issue cycle.
Attention cycles interact with the ways that journalists frame issues. Still, social media
communication patterns have independent trajectories that build on the emotions that the issue
and the platforms may encourage.
Attention cycles interact with the ways that journalists frame issues, but social media com-
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munication patterns have unique trajectories that build on the emotions that the issue and
the platforms may encourage (23, 24). The example of how Chinese medicine and Western
medicine play into unfounded beliefs illustrates the ways social and cultural belief systems
clash with scientific sources. Past research suggests that social media and traditional media
interact with each other, affecting public attention/discussion of an issue and leading to inter-
media agenda-setting.
Our findings do show that traditional mainstream media–such as Xinhua News Agency and
People’s Daily along with other popular market-driven or personal media accounts–play a role
in the arena of misinformation. Such finding echos the call for investigating the changing media
landscape through a holistic and inter-media perspective. Our study also offers insight into com-
bating misinformation in a massive public health crisis. As Lewandowsky et al. commented,
debunking misinformation merely from a science communication perspective may not be suf-
ficient to mitigate the adverse effects (25). Instead, incorporating cultural, political, and social
ingredients into the process of protecting the public from the threat of misinformation can yield
superior outcomes. In a time of an infectious disease crisis, people are more likely to believe
in unproven cures such as Shuanghuanglian. Social media amplifies emotional messages and
responses; the platforms themselves contribute to fast and unthinking responses, thus increasing
the possibilities that misinformation will circulate widely. Seemingly naive beliefs, such as the
efficacy of traditional herbal medicine, even without rigorous scientific evidence, may give res-
idents feelings of security and control. Sometimes, such misinformation about unproven cures
can be perpetuated by governments and other stakeholders. As noted earlier, Donald Trump has
repeatedly recommended the use of hydroxychloroquine–a yet unproven treatment for COVID-
19 which has well known potential risks. Meanwhile, the cacophony of different stakeholders
may crowd out the authoritative opinions of legitimate experts. Therefore, only when the public,
politicians, media, and other stakeholders are well informed and genuinely concerned with the
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public good, can they together push public discourses closer to the truth. The Shuanghuanglian
case also speaks to the impact that a lack of consensus in the science community may have on
the general public. When multiple sources report conflicting information, it can be difficult for
the layperson to sort out truth from fiction. When and how to convey expert disputes to the
public is a practical and meaningful question. Notably, during a pandemic crisis, the timing and
amount of publicizing information about expert disputes warrant more attention and research.
Finally, our results also raise questions about the responsibilities of the different components
in the media ecosystem in responding to infodemics. People using social media, the scientific
community is attempting to provide accurate and timely information, governments attempting
to productively intervene in a crisis, and platforms that carry and algorithmically manipulate the
messages all have essential roles in combating disasters, rumors, and damaging effects of mis-
information. It would be valuable for future research to investigate how any potential patterns
or cycles of misinformation vary across disasters, especially pandemics of emerging infectious
diseases. Wu et al. (2016), analyzing Ebola-related rumors on microblogs in China, found that
rumors tend to be related to real events associated with the virus. Specifically, rumors seem to
concentrate on the source of the virus, fear about the virus, preventive measures, among others.
Such a finding is, in general, consistent with that of the present study. Considering the nature
of emerging infectious diseases, representative topics–such as a source of the pathogen, detec-
tion, and prevention– are more likely to generate misinformation. Future research should also
look at how misinformation about pandemics differs from other crises such as earthquakes and
political unrest. More concretely, it would be enlightening to compare types of rumors across
different disasters or infodemics. Is there a typical lifecycle to what people attend to at different
phases of a crisis? Also, comparative research across countries would be valuable too. Consider
what is going on in the U.S. where a seeming lockdown is going on, but it is more voluntary
(monetary fines being a penalty, for example) than in China. Such a comparison reflects the role
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of the State, extending into more important questions about democracy and the struggle with
individual rights v. collective good. Research along this line will inform worldwide joint efforts
to combat a pandemic like Covid-19 too.
Data We collected Weibo posts identified as misinformation or gossip from Tencent, the Jiao
Zhen Platform 1, from 01/18/2020 to 03/27/2020. There were 531 COVID-related posts identi-
fied as misinformation or gossip in total. The Jiao Zhen Platform is a crowdsourcing platform
where users can dispel posts on Weibo as rumor or identify as inaccurate. The platform requests
identification of credentials, such as education and affiliated institution, as well as an explana-
tion by either citing the original source of information or a research article proving it to be false.
The platform employs a full staff to verify the information once a record has been uploaded 2.
We also collected 3.3 million Weibo posts from January 18, 2020, to February 26, 2020,
using the advanced search function of the Weibo keyword indexing. The keywords we used
included COVID-19, novel coronavirus, corona, epidemics, novel pneumonia, pneumonia in
Wuhan. We collected the data on February 26, 2020. We started from midnight on January 18,
2020, and each query searched all the posts within an hour. Each time, 50 pages were returned,
each contained around 20 posts. Therefore, if the number of posts within that hour exceeded
1000, the information could no be collected in full due to the limitations of the search function.
We continued this process control until the end of February 26, 2020.
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